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ABSTRACT 
THE LIMITATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE 
by Anthony Glenn Jordan 
August 2013 
The theory of Democratic Peace suggests that democracies are unlikely to wage 
war on one another, yet it spends little time actually defining what democracies are. 
Research on the theory of Democratic Peace suggests that the theory only applies to 
mature democracies, but how is maturity determined? The criteria used by multiple 
scholars is needed to defend the theory from particular challenges such as the Cenepa 
Valley War, but even with such defenses, the criteria omits how a state treats women and 
racial minorities. These omissions become clear when one examines how scholars treat 
the United States of America. This thesis will assert that the criteria for determining a 
democracy's maturity is incomplete and requires revision. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The theory of Democratic Peace has existed for decades with few challenges. 
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While its origins can be traced to Kant, the notion of Democratic Peace laid dormant until 
Dean Babst (Gaubatz 1999, 3) performed statistical analysis on it in 1972. The theory of 
Democratic Peace has become readily accepted in the Political Science field of 
International Relations with few challenges emerging since its resurgence. While the 
degree of acceptance varies (realists view it as an anomaly while liberals use it to 
legitimize their positions), few have come forward and outright denied the theory's 
validity. It is a very difficult theory to challenge, but part of that difficulty comes from a 
lack of clarity within the definition of the theory. Stating that "Democracies do not go to 
war with one another" does not simplify matters. There are criteria for a state to become 
a "full" or "mature" democracy, yet does one ignore it and count democratizing states and 
democracies as one? While most scholars do not count democratizing states when 
examining Democratic Peace, they are not in complete agreement on what constitutes a 
mature democracy. Such disagreements raise a range of questions, including the 
following ones. Which classification should be used? What if scholars cannot agree on 
the classification of states in a war? Should Democratic Peace emerge unscathed due to a 
disagreement in classification? If that happens to be the case, then the theory would 
never face any scrutiny. 
Conflicts within Literature 
Wars such as the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain and the 
Kargil War between India and Pakistan in May-July 1999 appear to challenge Democratic 
Peace. All of the combatants employed democracy to select their leaders to various 
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extents. Such examples could challenge Democratic Peace, but scholars such as Michael 
Doyle (2012) and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2007) would suggest that Great 
Britain and Pakistan, respectively, were not mature democracies at the time of these wars. 
Despite the fact that all of the belligerents had democratic regimes, scholars require more 
from states than fair elections as far as Democratic Peace is concerned. 
In creating his Liberal Peace, Michael Doyle (2012) set his own criteria for 
labeling a regime as "liberal." The name change was not made purely for aesthetics. 
Doyle required more from a regime than the election of its leaders. Should a regime be 
able to meet the four criteria set by Doyle, then it could be called "liberal." Doyle's work 
suggests that liberal states would not go to war with one another. While Doyle could 
defend his Liberal Peace from the challenges of the War of 1812 and the Kargil War, he 
would have trouble with the challenge of the Cenepa Valley War, which pitted Ecuador 
against Peru in January and February 1995. In the Cenepa Valley War, both combatants 
were states Doyle classified as liberal. 
The work of Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (20 11) can be 
used to address the challenges of the Falkland Islands War and the Cenepa Valley War. 
Using their criteria for what makes a mature democracy, one can argue that Argentina and 
Ecuador and Peru, respectively, are not mature democracies. As suggested by other 
scholars, not all democracies qualify for coverage by Democratic Peace. This time, 
however, the criteria for defining a mature democracy had to change to address two 
different challenges. 
In addition to requiring different criteria to define liberal regimes or mature 
democracies, scholars are not all in agreement over the source of this peace. Erik 
Gartzke (2007) argues that similar regime types do not explain the peaceful nature 
between liberal states/mature democracies. While addressing these arguments is 
important, Democratic Peace cannot begin to defend itself until it can figure out how to 
qualify the states it is supposed to explain. 
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Of all the scholars who defined mature democracies/liberal regimes, only Michael 
Doyle (2012) argued for Democratic Peace. The cases selected, particularly the Cenepa 
Valley War, will be used to argue that Doyle's criteria for a liberal regime need revisiting. 
His criteria are not adequate to address all challenges to Democratic Peace let alone 
competing theories to explain the peace between the democratic/liberal states. While 
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2007) add another wrinkle in terms of defining a 
mature democracy, the criteria set forth by Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted 
Robert Gurr (20 11) is an even more precise measure for a democracy's maturity. Their 
qualifications for a mature democracy are much more restrictive than Doyle's. 
Research Questions 
In particular this thesis addresses the following research question. Do more 
restrictive measurements on a democracy's maturity damage Democratic Peace's ability 
to explain the peace among the states whose behavior it explains? Borrowing from 
arguments made by Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger (2013), this thesis presents and 
assesses the extent of the validity of the following hypothesis. Placing more restrictive 
measures on a democracy's maturity lower the total number of mature democracies to a 
level where Democratic Peace cannot maintain its monopoly on the explanation for peace 
among these states. The cases of the War of 1812 and the Kargil War will demonstrate 
how Doyle's criteria can successfully defend Liberal Peace, but not without major 
questions emerging in regard to his measurement of a state's liberalness. In particular 
Doyle's labeling of the United States as liberal from its inception. The case of the Cenepa 
Valley War will demonstrate that liberal regimes can go to war with one another, which 
suggests a need for more restrictive measurements of liberalness/maturity. 
Thesis Outline 
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This argument will begin with a literature review of Democratic Peace, the nature 
of democracies, an examination of mature democracies, the contrast of democracies 
versus democratizing states, an examination of the different definitions of mature 
democracies, an examination of arguments against Democratic Peace and an examination 
of how war is classified. The thesis will transition to the methodology chapter where the 
use of case studies will be explained and defended. Following the methodology chapter, 
the three cases will be detailed and analyzed. There will be a conclusion chapter then the 
final chapter will discuss the importance of the findings and suggest ways in which the 
research may be built upon and continued. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
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The simplest way to define Democratic Peace Theory is to declare that 
democracies do not wage war on one another. The potential importance of this theory 
cannot be overstated. The desire to pay the costs of implementing democracy in other 
states would be slower to wane if it were accepted and true that such costs were 
investments in a future world peace. Public feelings on military action are just one way 
in which such a simple theory can have such a significant effect. Studying literature on 
the subject, however, expands that simple theory and suggests it may not be as powerful 
as it appears from the outset. This chapter will begin with a literature review of 
Democratic Peace, the nature of democracies, an examination of mature democracies, the 
contrast of democracies versus democratizing states, an examination of the different 
definitions of mature democracies, an examination of arguments against Democratic 
Peace and an examination of how war is classified. 
Origin of Democratic Peace 
Democratic Peace can trace its roots back to Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace. 
Kant's argument for his Perpetual Peace rested mostly upon two sections and the articles 
within those two sections. In his First Section (the Preliminary Articles for Perpetual 
Peace), Kant had six articles: 
1. "No treaty of peace that tacitly reserves issues for a future war shall be held 
valid" (Humphrey 1983, 107). 
2. "No independent nation, be it large or small, may be acquired by another 
nation by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift" (Humphrey 1983, 108). 
3. "Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall be gradually abolished" (Humphrey 
1983, 108). 
4. "No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the foreign affairs of 
the nation" (Humphrey 1983, 109). 
5. "No nation shall forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of 
another" (Humphrey 1983, 109). 
6. "No nation at war with another shall permit such acts of war as shall make 
mutual trust impossible during some future time of peace: Such acts include the use of 
Assassins (percussores) Poisoners (venefici) breach of surrender, instigation of treason 
(perduellio) in the opposing nation, etc." (Humphrey 1983, 109-110). 
These articles mostly covered interstate relations. They detailed how states 
should act toward one another. Kant argued that these articles, if applied by all states, 
would create his Perpetual Peace. However, he took things a step forward by detailing 
the type of government the states need to have in his Second Section. His Definitive 
Articles are: 
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1. "The civil constitution of every nation should be republican" (Humphrey 1983, 
112). 
2. "The right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states" (Humphrey 
1983, 115). 
3. "Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality" 
(Humphrey 1983, 118). 
Kant argued that the natural state of man is war and that "the state of peace must 
therefore be established, for the suspension of hostilities does not provide the security of 
peace" (Humphrey 1983, 111). Kant continues by arguing "Although a treaty of peace 
can put an end to some particular war, it cannot end the state of war (the tendency always 
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to find a new pretext for war)" (Humphrey 1983, 116). Kant's choice to list the articles of 
interstate action before articles that address the states themselves as well as the individual 
is perplexing. He makes it clear that states must be republican for Perpetual Peace, so it 
stands to reason that the states must reform before the nature of interstate relations 
reform. 
Kant does make it clear that a republican government is necessary for Perpetual 
Peace. He argues that "So far as [the matter of] right is concerned, republicanism is the 
original foundation of all forms of civil constitution" (Humphrey 1983, 112-113). Kant 
reasons that "if the form of government is to cohere with the concept of right, it must 
include the representative system, which is possible only in a republican form of 
government" (Humphrey 1983, 115). Among the qualities Kant gives republicanism are 
its ability to accord with "the principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as 
men), second, it accords with the principles of the dependence of everyone on a single, 
common [source of] legislation (as subjects), and, third, it accords with the law of the 
equality of them all (as citizens)" (Humphrey 1983, 112). Kant argues that citizens of a 
republican state will consider all the calamities of war before committing to it while non-
republican states find that "the easiest thing to do is to declare war" (Humphrey 1983, 
113). Among the costs that republican states will consider (and non-republican states will 
not) are "doing the fighting themselves, paying the costs of war from their own resources, 
having to repair at great sacrifice the war's devastation, and, finally, the ultimate evil that 
would make peace itself better, never being able-because of new and constant wars- to 
expunge the burden of debt" (Humphrey 1983, 113). 
Kant also makes a distinction between a republican state and a democratic state. 
Kant allows government to be classified into two categories: republican and despotic. He 
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defines republicanism as "that political principle whereby executive power (the 
government) is separated from legislative power" (Humphrey 1983, 114). He defines 
despotism as when "the ruler independently executes all laws that it has itself made" 
(Humphrey 1983, 114) and where "rulers have taken hold of the public will and treated it 
as their own private will" (Humphrey 1983, 114). He argues that democracy is a form of 
despotism "because it sets up an executive power in which all citizens make decisions 
about and, if need be, against one (who therefore does not agree); consequently, all, who 
are not quite all, decide, so that the general will contradicts both itself and freedom" 
(Humphrey 1983, 114). Kant adds that "every form of government that is not 
representative is properly speaking without form, because one and the same person can 
no more be at one and the same time legislator and executor of his will" (Humphrey 
1983, 114). 
Kant argues that there are three kinds of sovereignty. The first form is where 
there is one ruler, an autocracy. The second form is where some rule, an aristocracy. The 
third form is where all rule, which is a democracy (Humphrey 1983, 113). Kant concedes 
that the first two "forms of political constitution are defective inasmuch as they always 
leave room for a democratic form of government, it is nonetheless possible that they 
assume a form of government that accords with the spirit of a representative system" 
(Humphrey 1983, 114). Kant argues that the democratic form makes such an end 
impossible due to the fact that everyone wants to rule in a democratic state. Kant goes on 
to reason that "the smaller the number of persons who exercise the power of a nation (the 
number of rulers), the more they represent and the closer the political constitution 
approximates the possibility of republicanism ... and the constitution can hope through 
gradual reforms finally to become republican" (Humphrey 1983, 114). 
Kant's latter two Definitive Article do not address the individual governments of 
the states themselves, but are concerned with protecting the rights of the individual. The 
Second Definitive Article called upon other states to ensure the freedoms and republican 
governments of their neighbors are preserved and protected. Kant argued that "each 
nation and should demand that the others enter into a contract resembling the civil one 
and guaranteeing the rights of each" (Humphrey 1983, 115). Kant made it clear that this 
must be federation of free states and not a new government that supersedes the existing 
governments when he viewed "many nations in a single nation would constitute only a 
single nation" (Humphrey 1983, 115). Kant recommended that states form a "league of 
peace" (Humphrey 1983, 117). He argues that a key difference between a "league of 
peace" and a treaty of peace is that the treaties are created to stop one war while the 
league would be focused on ending all wars. 
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Kant's Third Definitive Article addressed the right of the individual or, as he said, 
"the right of an alien not to be treated as an enemy upon his arrival in another's country" 
(Humphrey 1983, 118). Kant does not advocate open borders as he acknowledges the 
state's right to tum away citizens of another country, but the state must do it without 
killing the alien nor is it allowed to treat the alien as an enemy if he or she acts peacefully 
(Humphrey 1983, 118). Kant finds the conduct of commercial states inhospitable to 
foreign people and lands. He cites the commercial states' treatment toward "the lands 
occupied by the blacks, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc." (Humphrey 1983, 119). He 
specifically notes that "foreign soldiers were imported in East India under the pretext of 
merely establishing economic relations, and with them came subjection of the natives, 
incitement of various nations to widespread wars among themselves, famine, rebellion, 
treachery, and the entire litany of evils that can afflict the human race" (Humphrey 1983, 
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119). To further his argument, Kant notes the Sugar Islands, which he argues is "the seat 
of the cruellest [SIC} and most ingenious slavery, yield no true profit, but serve only the 
indirect and not very profitable purpose of training sailors for ships of war, which in tum 
aids the pursuit of wars in Europe" (Humphrey 1983, 119). Kant closed his argument 
with "because a (narrower or wider) community widely prevails among the Earth's 
peoples, a transgression of rights in one place in the world is felt everywhere; 
consequently, the idea of cosmopolitan right is not fantastic and exaggerated, but rather 
an amendment to the unwritten code of national and international rights" (Humphrey 
1983, 119). 
Democratic Peace sprouted from Perpetual Peace, but particularly from the First 
Definitive Article. Before· states were to follow the other articles, they had to be 
republican. Kant created a clear link between peace and republicanism. Though he did 
not directly say it, Kant suggested that republican regimes are more likely to be peaceful 
with one another if for other reason than the fact that they are the only states that are 
qualified to follow the other articles of Perpetual Peace. 
Another article that has a smaller link to Democratic Peace is the Fifth 
Preliminary Article. States will not achieve Perpetual Peace if they interfere with the 
constitution and government of another state. Kant suggests that war is not the only 
hurdle to peace. States may not declare war on one another, but interfering with another 
state's government or constitution certainly is not peaceful. 
Michael Doyle's Contributions to Democratic Peace 
Michael Doyle argues that liberal international theory holds that states have the 
right to be free from foreign intervention and, since citizens possess moral autonomy and 
the right to liberty, their democratic states have a right to exercise political independence 
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(2012, 18). He goes so far as to argue that "mutual respect for these rights then becomes 
the touchstone of international liberal theory" (2012, 18). Within the framework of 
international liberal theory, Doyle found that "these conventions of mutual respect have 
formed a cooperative foundation for relations among liberal democracies of a remarkably 
effective kind" (2012, 18). That leads him to conclude that "even though liberal states 
have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure 
liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another" (2012, 18). Doyle accepts that 
such war is possible, but his evidence suggests that these liberal democratic states possess 
a predisposition against war with one another (2012, 18). His evidence also suggests that 
even threats of war have come to be viewed as illegitimate. He identifies a "liberal zone 
of peace" or a "pacific union" (2012, 18) that has been created with liberal regimes/states 
and exists with them. 
In defining "liberal regimes" Doyle used four institutions that he suggested are 
essential to the classification: "market and private property economies; polities that are 
externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical rights; and 'republican' (whether 
republican or monarchical), representative, government" (2012, 17). The final 
requirement assumes that the "legislative branch have an effective role in public policy 
and be formally and competitively, either potentially or actually, elected" (2012, 17). 
Another requirement is that government is internally sovereign with Doyle's primary 
examples being foreign affairs and the military (2012, 17). 
Capitalist Peace 
Even among the liberal scholars, there was not a universal acceptance for regime 
type as the explanation of Liberal Peace. Erik Gartzke argued that Liberal Peace could be 
the result of "capitalism and common interstate interests" (2007, 166). His study in 2007 
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offered "evidence suggesting that capitalism, and not democracy, leads to peace" (2007, 
180). The same study left Gartzke to conclude "Democratization, paradoxically, implies 
increasing tensions among democracies. Free markets and development, in contrast, lead 
nations closer together, or ... down grade historic territorial animosities" (2007, 182). He 
saw his argument as an extension of scholars such as Montesquieu, Paine, Bastiat, 
Cobden and Angell who all suggested in one form or another that market forces could 
end war (2007, 167). John Stuart Mill, in particular, argued that market forces could 
render war obsolete (1902, 390). 
Gartzke argued that peace could be the result of three attributes of mature 
capitalist economies (2007, 166). The first attribute was that "territorial expansion is 
tempered by the rising importance of intellectual and financial capital" (2007, 166). 
Gartzke argued that acquiring land offers too small of a financial incentive for capitalistic 
economies to go to war. He was suggested that resources could be more cheaply acquired 
on the market instead of through military occupation (2007, 166). Gartzke also argued 
that development does not increase the likelihood of war, but only affects what states 
fight over and with whom they fight (2007, 166). 
The second attribute of mature capitalistic economies that could explain peace is 
the foreign policy goals of developed nations after World War II (2007, 166). Gartzke 
argued that the absence of territorial tensions as well as a consensus regarding how the 
international system should be ordered "has allowed liberal states to cooperate and to 
accommodate minor differences" (2007, 166). Gartzke, however, does question if this 
cooperation will last (2007, 166). 
The third attribute of mature capitalistic economies that could explain peace is the 
mechanism created by global capital markets that allows communication as an alternative 
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to war (2007, 166). Gartzke argues that these three attributes can individually "influence 
patterns of warfare in the modem world" (2007, 166). He also argues that when these 
attributes are combined they "explain the absence of war among states in the developed 
world and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace" (2007, 166). 
Maoz and Russett (1992) examined trade in goods and services in relation to 
Democratic Peace, but Gartzke argues that they failed to include capital markets and offer 
"only a cursory assessment of economic development" (2007, 167). In modem times 
trade has been evaluated quite often by scholars such as Bliss and Russett (1998), Oneal 
and Ray (1997) and Polachek (1997) among others. Gartzke argues that "trade is 
arguably the least important in terms of mitigating warfare" (2007, 170). Gartzke and Li 
(2003) argued that financial markets, monetary policy and economic development all 
play a more important role in promoting peace than trade. 
A Temporary Democratic Peace? 
Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger argue that Democratic Peace may only be a 
temporary condition for the international community. They argue that similarities and 
differences between states can "orient and propagate conflict" (2013, 171). They "offer a 
simple explanation for interstate conflict in which the salience of similarity or difference 
varies with the prevalence or capabilities of groups" (2013, 171). They suggest that when 
autocracies significantly outnumber democracies and pose a threat, the bonds among 
democratic states will strengthen; however, as the threat disappears, so will the bonds 
(2013, 171). Building upon that point, they argue that "difference is most likely an 
important proximate determinant of conflict" (2013, 182). 
Gartzke and Weisiger note the theory of Autocratic Peace to support dynamic 
difference (2013, 171), the theory and the debate about in scholarly circles suggests that a 
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mature democracy may not be the only regime type that can enjoy peace with other 
similar regimes. That does not mean that Autocratic Peace is thought to work exactly like 
Democratic Peace. The theory suggests that "jointly autocratic dyads are more peaceful 
than heterogeneous dyads" (2013, 171), yet "remaining somewhat less peaceful than 
paired democracies" (2013, 171). They suggest that "logical elegance and the empirical 
similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical arguments 
that spring from regime similarity in general" (2013, 173). 
Gleditsch and Ward (2006) suggest the regional mix of regime types may 
influence whether or not a state democratizes. Gartzke and Weisiger (2013) argue that 
the clustering of similar states aids Democratic Peace (2013, 173). Those similarities 
may have as much to do with the peaceful nature of democratic states as democracy does. 
They stop short of suggesting that difference causes disputes. They acknowledge that 
states or other opponents will forge bargains by mutual consent. "Difference provides the 
basis for conflict and serves to define the realm where force becomes an option" (2013, 
182). Gartzke and Weisiger conclude their research by suggesting that Democratic Peace 
may be conditional. They argue that regime type difference is only one difference among 
many that could create groups with different interests. They identify other potential 
differences as religious, ethnic, ideological, linguistic and cultural (2013, 182). This 
research suggests a world full of democratic states may be much different than what Kant 
and Doyle envisioned. If there is an absence of an autocratic threat, democracies lose an 
incentive for peaceful behavior and may begin to be divided by their differences. 
Defining "Democracy" 
While Doyle offers a detailed defmition for what a liberal regime is, Kant is less 
detailed on the particular aspects of a republic. That leads one to assume that any form of 
a republic would qualify in Kant's eyes. Even with Democratic Peace, there is an 
assumption of what a democracy is, but that could be used rather liberally. 
Understanding forms of democracy and the characteristics of democracy aid in 
examining Democratic Peace. 
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Defining "democracy" is not a particularly tricky task, nor is classifying a 
government as "democratic." Theoretically, any government that permits its citizens to 
vote one time (regardless of how insignificant the election or referendum many be) may 
be classified as "democratic." To build further upon that, a dictator may allow the 
citizens to vote on trivial issues or there may be elections at the local level in an 
autocracy, but Democratic Peace would not include either instance. That is enough to 
make a distinction between a state being a democracy and a state employing democratic 
elements. 
Gaubatz noted that there were 117 forman y democratic states ( 1999, 1) in the 
world (1999, 173). Those numbers are reduced when Gaubatz further qualifies the data 
by citing Freedom Review rating of "76 as states in which the citizens enjoy a broad 
range of political rights and civil liberties" ( 1999, 173 ). The remain formal democratic 
states had some constraints on political rights and civil liberties (1999, 173). There are 
already a couple of problems with Gaubatz's data. The first problem is that Gaubatz did 
not include Freedom Review's definition of what constitutes a "formal democracy." It 
can be inferred that a formal democracy is likely a state where its legislature and/or 
executive leader are democratically elected, but that is still not enough. Even if this 
inference is correct, 35% of the formally democratic states have some constraints on 
political rights and civil liberties. How does one make the distinction between a state 
having high levels of political rights and civil liberties and one that places constraints 
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upon them? Is there a state (let alone a democracy) that places no constraints on political 
rights and civil liberties? It is doubt that such an anarchical state exists, so it is fair to say 
that all democracies place some constraints on political rights and civil liberties. That 
makes the distinction arbitrary, but either Freedom Review does not make it or Gaubatz 
fails to include it. This broad view of what constitutes a democracy can be convenient! y 
used to forgive unexpected results in experiments, which is not academically sound. It 
could also allow for radically different takes on Democratic Peace to appear correct as 
each experiment could freely define a "democracy" however it likes and technically be 
correct. 
Mansfield and Snyder offer little aid in the quest to define democracy as their take 
on Democratic Peace involves "mature" democracies(2007, 1). They again address 
mature democracies in discussing states paths to democratization (2007, 21), but fail to 
define what a "mature democracy" is. Ravlo, Gleditsch and Dorussen (2003) do not 
even choose to qualify democracies to that extent, nor does Zinnes (2004 ). 
Some hope for a definition can be found in the qualities that researchers expect 
forms of governance who qualify as democracies (as covered by Democratic Peace) to 
possess. Mansfield and Snyder argue that "democratic power rests especially on the 
distinctive ability of democratic institutions and ideology to align private interests with 
collective purposes" (2007, 49). They contrast mature democracies and autocracy when 
they suggest that "repression plays a far smaller role in strategies of rule in mature 
democracies than it does in autocracies" (2007, 49). A miniscule amount of information 
is given about the nature of democracies and what they do not do. 
Mansfield and Snyder pay special attention to the roles of institutions in 
democracies. They argue that democratic institutions provide checks for patronage with 
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the risk of publicity and electoral accountability checking interests with special access to 
policy-makers (2007, 50). They also argue that democratic institutions "make 
government authorities accountable to the average voter" (2007, 51). Institutions in 
mature democracies are more predictable and provide greater continuity than institutions 
in non-democracies (2007, 51). Mansfield and Snyder suggest that democratic 
institutions "ceaselessly scrutinize the government's foreign policies and make public the 
information that is needed to weigh the likely consequences of military actions in a 
credible way" (2007, 52). This does not directly define what a "mature democracy" is, 
but it provides a litmus test for determining if a democracy qualifies for the label. If the 
institutions of a democracy cannot achieve what Mansfield and Snyder suggest, then the 
democracy in question likely cannot be labeled as "mature." 
Mansfield and Snyder also shed some light on what the elements of a "mature 
democracy" should provide. They define voting as "a decision-making system that tends 
to empower diffuse interests, such as those of taxpayers or of consumers, rather than 
concentrated interests, such as recipients of subsidies or producers" (2007, 50). They 
suggest that "political systems that empower diffuse interests should be less war-prone 
than those that empower narrowly parochial interests" (2007, 50). The application of 
inductive reasoning would suggest that a voting system that empowers diffuse interests is 
the characteristic of a "mature democracy." For the purposes of Democratic Peace, the 
democratic element of voting is not in itself enough to qualify a democracy as "mature," 
which would leave that democracy ineligible to be covered by the theory. 
In one of their many statements on Democratic Peace, Mansfield and Snyder 
interestingly argue that "fully democratic regimes have never fought wars against other 
democracies" (2007, 49). Qualifying a state's leadership as a "fully democratic regime" 
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is different than declaring a state to be a "mature democracy." With this statement, 
Mansfield and Snyder again go further than other researchers in creating some parameters 
for which kind of democracies are included in Democratic Peace Theory. One can infer 
that a "fully democratic regime" is a regime that has been elected by a fully democratic 
process. 
With the available material, it can be said that a "mature democracy" is distinct 
from any state that is labeled a "democracy" or that is in the process of democratizing. 
Mature democracies reach their status by possessing democratic institutions that check 
and scrutinize all foreign policies. These institutions will also decrease or prevent 
repression of certain groups and check patronage of special interests. Mature 
democracies also possess a voting system that successfully empowers diffuse interests. 
They are also governed by regimes that come to power via a fully democratic process. 
These are all qualities that are possessed by "mature democracies" that are eligible to be 
represented by the notion of Democratic Peace. States that lack these qualities (yet 
consider themselves to be democracies) are likely in the process of democratization. 
State that is a democracy (more specifically, a "mature democracy") and a state that is 
democratizing are not the same. 
Democratizing States Versus Democracies 
While a definition of "democracy" is lacking, there is a strong belief that there is a 
point at which "democratization" gives way to "democracy." Mansfield and Snyder 
suggested that democratization is a two phase process: from an autocracy to a partially 
democratic regime and from a partially democratic regime to a fully institutionalized 
democracy (2007, 69). They characterize the former as "cases in which elites conclude 
bargains involving limited political liberalization, as well as cases in which elites allow 
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voting but merely as a temporary expedient" (2007, 70) and argue that hostilities are 
more likely during that phase. They characterized the second phase as a time when "the 
regime moves to adopt a system of unfettered political competition and full governmental 
accountability to a broad electorate" (2007, 70). They also characterize democracy as a 
rare event and argue that "incomplete democratic transitions have tended to occur more 
frequently than complete democratic shifts" (2007, 80). 
Mansfield and Snyder also describe states that are transitioning to democracy as 
"quite war-prone toward regimes of all types" (2007, 21). They describe the attitude of 
the public in a mature democracy as a prudent constraint on the desire of the elites to 
declare war, but describe the public in democratizing states as reckless. The two 
questions that need to be asked are: Why do citizens in democratizing states (and the 
states themselves) appear to be more belligerent and is there a clear, identifiable point at 
which the process of democratizing concludes and mature democracy can be observed? 
In addressing the first question, one could answer it by claiming that citizens in 
democratizing states possess warlike sensibilities and support hawkish candidates. 
Completely changing a style of government can be a violent affair, and it could be 
theorized that hawkish policies could be normalized and/or psychologically comforting. 
Citizens and states may also become vulnerable after the civil strife that allowed the tides 
of democracy to wash over the state. Becoming a weakened state could make it easy 
prey for neighboring states. The warlike attitude could also be explained by simply 
saying that transitions from any regime increases belligerence. Mansfield and Snyder 
examine all these rationales and find little evidence to support them. They suggest the 
hostility of democratizing states are likely not the result of "voters ... with warlike 
preferences" (2007, 21) and "weakened states make attractive targets for neighboring 
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states" (2007, 21) and that "transitions from any regime type to any other cause war" 
(2007, 21). Their experiment refuted "the view that transitional democracies are simply 
inviting targets of attack due to their temporary weakness" (2007, 95) and "the view that 
any regime change is likely to precipitate the outbreak of war" (2007, 95). If those 
reasons, despite their theoretical appeal, are not the causes of the belligerence in 
democratizing states, then what is? 
Mansfield and Snyder supply the exact same answer to this question as which is 
inferred when one wonders how they would explain what a "mature democracy" is: 
political institutions (2007, 21). They argue that "democratizing states are 
disproportionately war-prone when they lack the coherent political institutions needed to 
manage intensified domestic political competition and to prevent it from provoking 
foreign conflicts" (2007, 21). They expand on this by saying, "incomplete 
democratization occurring in a context of weak governmental institutions undermines the 
state's ability to manage elite interest groups and newly politicized mass groups" (2007, 
87). In the previous section, it was the inference of institutions as a regulating force that 
turned a democracy into a "mature democracy." Now institutions are suggested to be 
peace-promoting elements of a democracy, and something that democratizing states are 
missing and need to be working toward obtaining. 
This suggestion by Mansfield and Snyder is important because it could 
successfully answer both questions. It could now be argued that democratizing states and 
their citizens are more belligerent because they lack the political institutions that 
scrutinize foreign policies, represent minority interests, as well as provide alternatives to 
violence for a minority that feels ignored, and place checks on government activity and 
its officials. It could also be argued that the establishment and presence of coherent 
political institutions signifies the end of the democratization process and the emergence 
of a mature democracy. 
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There are some issues that arise with this suggestion. The first one is how strong 
is Mansfield and Snyder's data. Should their experiment and subsequent data be trusted? 
Was their experiment sound? Another issue comes with the idea of a "democracy" and a 
"mature democracy." There were inferences made on the differences between the two, 
but the rationale in making those inferences wound up being used by Mansfield and 
Snyder to juxtapose a democratizing state from a "mature democracy." These issues 
must be addressed and settled, especially the former. The latter can be thought of as an 
issue of semantics because concepts for democracies covered by Democratic Peace have 
been established and dubbing a state with strong political institutions that promote peace 
a "mature democracy" or a "democracy" does not affect the quality of the argument. The 
first issue could affect the quality of the argument and cannot be easily dismissed. 
Mansfield and Snyder tested their argument with a combination of narrative case 
studies and quantitative techniques (2007, 69). For their analysis they obtained measures 
of "democratization, the strength of domestic institutions, and war" (2007, 69). They 
distinguish between the two phases of a democratic transition as "when mass groups are 
initially being politically mobilized; and later, when the impending completion of the 
democratization process may foreclose options for threatened elites" (2007, 72). They 
measure regime type and regime change with Polity III data, which was developed by 
Ted Robert Gurr and colleagues (2007, 73). Polity III "furnishes longitudinal indicators 
of domestic institutions for 177 countries during the period 1800-1994" (2007, 73 ). In 
their study the deem administrative institutions (such as non-corrupt bureaucracies, 
professional news media, the police force (that follows the law) and institutions that 
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regulate political competition) to be the most important (2007, 87). Though measures are 
scarce for these institution, Mansfield and Snyder use an 11-point index created by Gurr 
and his colleagues that measures how much domestic authority is concentrated in a state's 
central government (2007, 88). To measure war they relied upon the Correlates of War 
Project's definition of war and used its data on war (2007, 91 ). 
Using these measures, their subsequent analyses and a monadic research design 
(2007, 139), Mansfield and Snyder produced results that supported their argument of 
"incomplete democratic transitions are especially likely to promote wars in countries 
where government institutions are weak and where little power is concentrated in the 
hands of national officials" (2007, 124). The results also found that states in the initial 
stages of democratization are more likely to become involved in wars (2007, 129). 
Another consequence of these results was support for Mansfield and Snyder's argument 
that "incomplete democratization is a potent impetus to war when domestic institutions 
are fragmented and weak" (2007, 139). 
The research behind and design of Mansfield and Snyder's experiment is sound 
enough to allow one to take their argument seriously. They presented compelling 
evidence to support their argument that democratizing states are more prone to war. 
Their main argument, the role of coherent political institutions in encouraging peace in 
mature democracies, is also well-supported by their research. Their most serious flaw 
was the lack of concern in identifying the possibility of a state finishing the 
democratization process and becoming a democracy, but not a "mature democracy" or are 
the only options available to states either be a democratizing state or be a "mature 
democracy?" As earlier stated, this may merely be an argument about semantics, and it 
does not affect the quality of Mansfield and Snyder's argument. 
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Another Measurement for Maturity 
The Polity III Project was followed by Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted 
Robert Gurr's (2011) Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 
1800-2011. Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr's Polity IV Project (2011) selects states with 
populations greater than 500,000 in 2011 for their annual, cross-national, time series that 
tracks and codes regime type and regime change. They use an eleven point scale (0-10) 
to indicate how democratic a state is. They suggest that a mature democracy would have 
three characteristics: open and fully competitive political participation, elective executive 
recruitment and substantial constraints on the chief executive. Open and fully 
competitive political participation is measured by the variable Competitiveness of 
Political Participation (PARCOMP). A state viewed as "Competitive" would be coded as 
"5." A state coded with any other number is unlikely to have open and fully competitive 
political participation. Open executive recruitment is measured by the variable 
Competitiveness Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP). A state that would satisfy the open 
executive recruitment characteristic would have elections for their executives, which 
would be coded as "3" for the XRCOMP variable. Finally, restraints on the chief 
executive are measured with the Constraint on the Chief Executive (XCONST) variable. 
Chief executives with substantial limitations are coded with "5;" however, there are 
measures above "5" that would satisfy the characteristic, too. An intermediate category 
coded as "6" and "Executive parity or subordination," coded as "7 ," would both satisfy 
the characteristic of chief executives with substantial limitations. States coded with "5" 
in PARCOMP, "3" in XRCOMP and "5," "6" or "7" in XCONST could be considered 
mature democracies. 
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Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr's (2011) measurement for maturity is much more 
restrictive than Doyle's (2012). As of 1991 Doyle's liberal community totaled 54 states 
(2012, 147-149). At the same point in time, Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr would have only 
classified 26 states as mature. Even with another 20 years, Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr do 
not close the gap much. In 2011 they only considered 36 states to be mature 
democracies. Considering the fact that Doyle constructed his list before the fall of the 
Soviet Union, one could argue that the gap would not have shrank at all. It may have 
even grown had Doyle constructed his own list of liberal regimes in 2011. 
Defining "War" 
One must also examine the nature of "war." Ray notes that "controversies also 
arise about the categorization of conflicts as international or interstate war" (1995, 102). 
Ray accepts the Correlates of War criteria for determining if a conflict is a war (1995, 
102). The most recent criteria was published in Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank 
Wayman's (2010) Resort to War: 1816-2007, which considers a military conflict that 
involves 1,000 battle deaths within a twelve month period to be a war. Ray notes that this 
criteria is "almost universally accepted by those engaged in quantitative research on 
international war" (1995, 103). 
In addition to the 1,000 battle death requirement, Sarkees and Wayman (2010) 
also suggest that a war must include sustained combat involving organized armed forces. 
and that those armed forces must be capable of effective resistance. The effective 
resistance criteria was designed to prevent massacres and violence from unorganized 
individuals from qualifying as a war (2010). For a state to qualify as a war participant, it 
must either commit 1,000 troops to the war or suffer 100 battle deaths (2010). 
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Defense of 1,000 Battle Death Criteria 
While war may seem self-explanatory, adding the 1,000 battle death criteria 
makes a conflict easier to diagnose versus attempting to find proof of states declaring war 
on each other. There may be instances where states do not declare war, yet a military 
conflict results that kills 1,000 troops. There may be cases of a chief executive 
possessing the authority to deploy troops and initiate a conflict regardless of any 
legislative concerns. This accepted classification proves to be more useful than a state's 
classification. 
Ray acknowledges that there is some professional discomfort from those who 
disagree with the 1,000 battle death criteria (1995, 103). Ray accepts that the 1,000 battle 
death criteria is arbitrary, but argues that lowering the number of battle deaths would 
"risk categorizing as 'wars' extremely minor incidents of no real consequence" (1995, 
103). Ray also argues that lowering the threshold of battle deaths would create a large 
demand for specific battle death counts (1995, 103). Ray argues that a 1,000 battle death 
criteria prevents "phantom wars" from being counted (1995, 103). 
Contribution to Democratic Peace 
This thesis will build upon the literature by examining how liberal states/mature 
democracies are classified and critiquing the criteria used by Michael Doyle (2012) and 
Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (20 11) to classify states as liberal 
or democracies as mature. This thesis will show how the criteria of both Doyle and 
Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr work successfully and where they can be criticized. The 
criticism will come in how Doyle and Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr appear to pay little 
attention to the treatment of women and racial minorities by liberal states/mature 
democracies. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Defense of Method Selected 
Selecting a case study as the methodology for this thesis was an easy decision. 
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While other qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research may challenge 
particular facets of Democratic Peace, a case study provides the most direct challenge to 
the core of the theory and could have the greatest effect. Finding a case where two 
democracies waged war on one another challenges the theory. While not enough to fully 
discredit the theory, it could restrict the theory's areas of applicable use. It would further 
strip the theory's ability to generalize even further that the exclusion of democratizing 
states from the application. On the other hand, if this case study diffuses a potential 
challenge, then the theory is strengthened and is more apt to stand against future 
challenges. 
George and Bennett identify the case study approach as "the detailed examination 
of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be 
generalizable to other events" (2005, 5). They admit that case studies "have come in and 
out of favor over the past five decades as researchers have explored the possibilities of 
statistical methods ... and formal models" (2005, 5), but blame that on scholars more than 
any inherent defects in the methodology. They argue that "scholars' understanding of 
case studies is often distorted by critiques based on the assumptions of statistical 
methods" (2005, 6). George and Bennett note that only in the past three decades have 
scholars "formalized case study methods more completely and linked them to underlying 
arguments in the philosophy of science" (2005, 6). 
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The initial definition of the case study approach fits the argument well. 
Democratic Peace can be examined best at a practical level with real actions from states 
supporting or discrediting the theory. The defense of the method is crucial, too. Had case 
studies become antiquated and viewed as insufficient by modern scholars, then more time 
would have to be devoted to the choice of method and defense of the method. That 
would make it more difficult to create respect for the findings as they could take a 
backseat to the methodology used in obtaining them. The refinement of the method and 
continued use of it suggests a scholarly acceptance of its validity, which would eliminate 
a potentially massive problem. 
Yin identifies case studies as "the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions 
are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus 
is on contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context" (1994, 1). He disagrees 
with the hierarchy that dictates that "case studies were appropriate for the exploratory 
phase of an investigation, that surveys and histories were appropriate for the descriptive 
phase, and that experiments were the only way of doing explanatory or causal inquiries" 
(1994, 3). Yin argues that case studies may be used for all three phases, but remains 
aware of the criticisms when he also warns investigators to "exercise great care in 
designing and doing case studies to overcome traditional criticisms of the method" (1994, 
1). 
Yin, too, is aware of the criticisms that case studies face, but he believes the 
method is unfairly limited by scholars and, that with proper caution in regard to the 
design and application of the method, it provides a valid approach. His arguments 
strengthen the method as well as broaden its range, which was noted by George and 
Bennett. The lengthy defense of the method by both books as well as the suggestions that 
case studies have been limited by their current uses is enough to make me confident 
about using this particular method. 
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A case study of Democratic Peace is legitimate research. The method is 
acceptable and can be defended by contemporary scholars. The case study itself has 
received little attention when it comes to Democratic Peace due to the fact that the war 
rarely finds itself studied by international relations scholars. A case study of Democratic 
Peace could provide a viable challenge to the theory. 
Measurements for Maturity and War 
Michael Doyle created a list of his liberal regimes in 1983 (2012, 15-17). He also 
updated it eight years later (2012, 147-149). His later list only adds Honduras, Papua 
New Guinea, Argentina, South Korea and Taiwan. He does not downgrade any regimes 
from liberal to non-liberal over this time period. This list will be applied to each case to 
determine if the combatants qualify as liberal regimes. 
In addition to Doyle's list of liberal regimes, two data sets will be used in 
examining the cases. They are the Correlates of War's Inter-State War Data version 4.0 
and Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr's (2011) Polity N Project, 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011. The COW's Inter-State 
War Data can be found in Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman's (2010) Resort to 
War: 1816-2007. Their Inter-State War data set classifies a "war" as a conflict with 
sustained fighting that accumulates 1,000 battle deaths in a twelve month period. 
Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr's Polity IV Project selects states with populations greater than 
500,000 in 2011 for their annual, cross-national, time series that tracks regime change. 
Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011) use an eleven point scale (0-10) to indicate 
how democratic a state is. They suggest that a mature democracy would have three 
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characteristics: open and fully competitive political participation, elective executive 
recruitment and substantial constraints on the chief executive. Open and fully 
competitive political participation is measured by the variable Competitiveness of 
Political Participation (PARCOMP). A state viewed as "Competitive" would be coded as 
"5." A state coded with any other number is unlikely to have open and fully competitive 
political participation. Open executive recruitment is measured by the variable 
Competitiveness Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP). A state that would satisfy the open 
executive recruitment characteristic would have elections for their executives, which 
would be coded as "3" for the XRCOMP variable. Finally, restraints on the chief 
executive are measured with the Constraint on the Chief Executive (XCONST) variable. 
Chief executives with substantial limitations are coded with "5;" however, there are 
measures above "5" that would satisfy the characteristic, too. An intermediate category 
coded as "6" and "Executive parity or subordination," coded as "7 ," would both satisfy 
the characteristic of chief executives with substantial limitations. States coded with "5" 
in PARCOMP, "3" in XRCOMP and "5," "6" or "7" in XCONST could be considered 
mature democracies. 
The Polity IV Project divides a state's existence into time periods that signify 
different regimes leading the state. One must take the time period of each state that 
possessed a mature democracy and find out active the state was in wars over that period 
of time using the data from the Correlates of War. 
The Selected Cases 
Three cases were selected for this study, and each one serves a unique purpose. 
The cases are the Kargil War, the War of 1812 and the Cenepa Valley War. The order in 
which the cases are listed is the order in which they will be presented. Chronological 
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order was not used because of what each case contributes to this study. The order of the 
cases demonstrates how Democratic Peace can optimally defended then progresses to 
challenges to the theory made by the latter cases. 
Defense of the Inclusion of the Kargil War 
The purpose of the Kargil War's inclusion is to demonstrate the optimal way in 
which Democratic Peace is to be defended. India and Pakistan both have democratic 
regimes, but are those regimes mature? This is the question that dismisses many 
challenges to Democratic Peace due to the fact that one or both combatants will not be 
considered liberal by Michael Doyle. The Falkland Islands War could have been used to 
make this demonstration, too. The conflict featured two states that were democratic, but 
it has received much more scholarly attention than the Kargil War. The Kargil War was 
selected because it received less attention than the Falkland Islands War, and there is a 
higher likelihood of it offering some new to Democratic Peace. 
Defense ofthe Inclusion ofthe War of 1812 
The purpose of the War of 1812's inclusion, at first glance, appears to be the same 
as the Kargil War. Michael Doyle's list of liberal regimes will be able to fend off this 
potential challenge to Democratic Peace. The purpose of this case, however, is not how 
one of the combatants is deemed not to be liberal. The Kargil War will handle that. The 
War of 1812 offers an opportunity to further examine Doyle's criteria for classifying a 
state as liberal. While it would be possible to debate his criteria, his classification of the 
United States is most perplexing and damaging to his method of determining liberalness. 
Defense of the Inclusion of the Cenepa Valley War 
The purpose of the Cenepa Valley War is to demonstrate a conflict where two 
apparently liberal regimes went to war. When Doyle's liberal regimes list is used to code 
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states on the Sarkees and Wayman's (2010) data, this conflict between Ecuador and Peru 
appeared to violate Liberal Peace. Doyle's method of classifying states as liberal can be 
scrutinized even further with the case. Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr's (20 11) method to 
qualify states as mature democracies will need to be used. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE KARGIL WAR 
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Regardless of the Kargil War's effect on Democratic Peace, one cannot discuss the 
conflict without expressing a sense of relief that the fighting did not escalate between the 
two nuclear powers. Both states had successfully tested nuclear weapons in May 1998 
and participated in the Kargil War only a year later (Chari 2008, 12). Chari notes three 
specific events that could have led to a much more gruesome end to the fighting. The 
first was a report in the Washington Times that claimed the Indian Army was making 
defensive preparations on the border between the two states as armored units left their 
garrisons in Rajasthan (Chari 2008, 11). This led to the Pakistanis doing the same. 
However, given the much larger size of the Indian forces, there was speculation that 
having such smaller forces could lead Pakistan to use nuclear weapons (Chari 2008, 11). 
The second event was when Indian custom officials searched a North Korean flagged 
ship bound for Pakistan (Chari 2008, 11). Instead of carrying 148 containers full of water 
purification equipment, the ship contained "missile parts, machine tools, and blueprints of 
a Scud missile (Chari 2008, 11)." The third event came weeks after the conflict and was 
when an Indian fighter aircraft shot down a Pakistani maritime reconnaissance aircraft 
(Chari 2008, 11). Both states argued over whether the act violated the bilateral agreement 
on Prevention of Airspace Violations and for Permitting Over flights and Landings by 
Military Aircraft (Chari 2008, 12). 
Regime Type of Belligerents 
Pakistan 
Chandran (2008) notes Pakistan's National Assembly and the parliamentary 
system of democracy in place that produces a prime minister (2008, 30). Chandran 
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argues that fundamentalism in Pakistan has been declining and supports his argument by 
noting that the fundamentalist parties, Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamait-e-Ulema-Islam, only 
won 7 seats each in the 1988 election (2008, 30). Chandran argues that fundamentalist 
forces cannot be blamed for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifs actions that led to the Kargil 
War. This argument suggests that the government could act independently of the desires 
of fundamental forces and that these fundamental forces did not greatly interfere with the 
democratic process. The quality of the Pakistani democracy will be examined in the next 
chapter. 
India 
As a former colony of Great Britain, India adopted a parliamentary system of 
democracy. Rajain notes the upper house of the Indian legislature, Rajya Sabha, the 
lower house, Lok Sabha, a prime minister and president (2008, 196-197, 201). The 
history of this form of democracy created a political atmosphere strong enough to 
announce elections while Pakistani forces were retreating (Rajain 2008, 196). The 
quality of the Indian democracy will be examined in the next chapter. 
History of Hostility 
The Kargil War was not an isolated act of aggression between the states. Chari 
notes that there had been a pattern of hostilities since the Line of Control was established 
in 1972 (2008, 13). This pattern is seasonal and "occurs each year with the onset of 
spring and the melting of snows, allowing infiltration through the mountain passes (Chari 
2008, 13)." Chari suggests the pattern could be a result of boundary markers shifting 
during the winter or a result of troops deployed along the Line of Control who are 
attempting to improve their positioning and/or assisting intelligence operations (2008, 
13). Chari argued that the Kargil War was unique because it was marked by the 
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"surreptitious intrusion of regular Pakistani troops across the LoC, interspersed with 
mujahideen of both Pakistani and foreign origin (2008, 13). It was also unique in that the 
Pakistanis "succeeded in occupying and fortifying a large number of posts on the Indian 
side of the LoC" (Chari 2008, 13). 
Fighting in Jammu and Kashmir 
The fighting did not come as a surprise to the international community. Warring 
in Jammu and Kashmir was a frequent occurrence. "Kashmir has been either the 
prescient reason or the major theater of operations in all past Indo-Pak conflicts, and the 
Kargil sector has always been the scene of fierce engagements" (Chari 2008, 16). 
Fighting in this region became advantageous to the Pakistanis after the 1947-48 conflict. 
The ceasefire left the Pakistanis with a tactical advantage as they retain the heights that 
"could threaten Kargil town and disrupt the Srinagar-Leh highway" (Chari 2008, 16). In 
an attempt to shame its vulnerabilities, the Indians seized areas north of the Kargil-Dras 
sector during the1965 Indo-Pak war, but had to return it to Pakistan as stipulated in the 
Tashkent Agreement (Chari 2008, 16). The two states went to war again in 1971. The 
Indians captured several Pakistani posts across the cease-fire line. This time, however, 
the Indians retained the posts as the Simla Agreement declared: "the line of control 
resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides 
without prejudice to the recognized position of either side" (Chari 2008, 16). These areas 
would become the theater of conflict during the Kargil War (Chari 2008, 16). 
Inability to Stabilize Region 
The ceasefire did little to stop hostilities. India and Pakistan continued to fire 
across the Line of Control even after the ceasefire. The Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) classified the collective violence as an interstate conflict 
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starting in 1996 (Chari 2008, 16). India saw the artillery exchanges and firings as an 
affirmation of the distinction between of the temporary Line of Control and the 
permanent international border (Chari 2008, 17). Pakistan chose this area to capitalize on 
public sentiment that had grown frustrated with Srinagar's and New Delhi's refusals to 
grant autonomy to the Ladakh region, yet they granted an autonomous council to a 
Buddhist-dominated district, Leh (Chari 2008, 17). "This converted the Shia-Muslim-
dominated Kargil district into a separate region; it included a Sunni-Muslim pocket in 
Dras that had cultural and linguistic affinities across the LoC in the Skardu region of 
Pakistani-held Kashmir" (Chari 2008, 17). 
Pakistan's Reasons for War 
Chari argues that Pakistan's anti-India internal polity came from the four pillars of 
Punjab's dominance over Pakistan's governance; the steady Islamization of the country's 
polity; the control of the Army over its governance processes; and the influences of the 
United States, Saudi Arabia and China over its governments (2008, 17). Chari argues that 
the Kargil War highlights Pakistan's deep-rooted hatred of India "whilst sustaining the 
raison d'etre for Pakistan's creation and existence" (2008, 17). 
The Kargil War Begins 
"When the news of infiltration around Kargil by Pakistan-supported forces broke 
in the second week of May 1999, many in India thought it was part of the perpetual 
border clashes between the two countries" (Chandran 2008, 23). The action itself was 
puzzling given the improvement in relations between the two states with the Lahore 
Declaration (Chandran 2008, 23). Krishna lists six objectives the Pakistanis had when 
they began with their aggression. The first was to choke the strategic road linking 
Srinagar with Leh and prevent vital supplies for the ensuing winter reaching Indian 
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troops in Ladakh. The second was to occupy Dras and Kargil and open up the LoC issue. 
The third was to capture heights in the Batalik and Turtok areas to initially sever the 
southern Siachen Glacier, and later, choke access to both the northern and southern 
glaciers along the Nubra river, and force India to back down on Siachen. The fourth was 
to control the Mushkoh valley near Dras and use it as a major route for fresh infiltration. 
The fifth was to spread insurgency in Kargil district of Ladakh to ease the heat unleashed 
on militant groups in the Valley. The final objective was to bury the Simla Agreement by 
altering the LoC and bring Kashmir issue back on the international stage (2008, 98). 
Operation Vijay 
Between May 29 and June 2, the Indian armed forces retaliated (Krishna 2008, 
1 07). "Initial attacks [were] launched against enemy positions and special missions and 
patrols sent out from firm bases encountered stiff opposition and suffered some reverses" 
(Krishna 2008, 1 07). The Indian priorities in terms of which objectives to acquire was 
(in order): Dras sector, Mushkoh valley sector, Batalik sector and Kaksar area (Krishna 
2008, 109). Operation Vijay was now underway. 
Operation Vijay ended almost as quickly as it began. Indian forces captured 
positions at Mushkoh, Dras and Batalik by July 25, and Operation Vijay was terminated 
(Krishna 2008, 131 ). The success of Operation Vi jay came on the heels of the failure in 
peace talks between Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and United States President 
Bill Clinton. The two met on July 4, and Clinton urged Sharif to withdraw from the 
Indian side of the Line of Control (Krishna 2008, 131 ). Pakistan would announce the 
withdrawal of its troops on July 11, but only removed them from Kaksar (Krishna 2008, 
131). Pakistan left troops in Mushkoh, at a height called "Zulu;" in Dras, at location 
called "Saddle;" and at Batalik near the Line of Control (Krishna 2008, 131). The 
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Indians resumed military operations on July 16 to forcibly remove Pakistani forces from 
those three areas (Krishna 2008, 131). 
Impact of Operation Vijay 
Operation Vijay resulted in the deaths of 524 Indian soldiers (519 from the Army 
and 5 from the Air Force) as well as leaving 1,365 wounded (Krishna 2008, 137). There 
are various estimates on Pakistani casualties, but the low-end estimate, based on Pakistani 
and Indian calculations, is that 737 members of the Pakistani Army died (Krishna 2008, 
137). 
Effects of the Kargil War 
The Kargil War did little to create stability within the region. It was not the 
military conflict that could effectively end the power struggle in the region. It did, 
however, produce change in the region. The failure of the Kargil War effectively ended 
the regime in Pakistan as a military coup that took place in October 1999 (Chandran 
2008, 23). 
CHAPTERV 
ANALYSIS OF THE KARGIL WAR 
Qualifications as a War 
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The Kargil War will first need to be examined to determine whether or not 
Democratic Peace can apply to the conflict before its effect on the theory can be assessed. 
The easier determination to make is whether or not this conflict was an actual war or if 
the term was loosely applied. The best way to make this determination is to apply the 
1,000 battle death benchmark used by Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman (2010). 
The numbers used by Krishna (2008, 137) claim that 524 members of the Indian Army 
and Air Force died in the conflict while the low-end estimate for the Pakistanis is 737 
personnel were killed. Combining those two figures leaves a total of 1 ,261 battle deaths 
during the Kargil War. Sarkees and Wayman are slightly more conservative as they say 
India had 474 battle deaths and Pakistan had 698 battle deaths for a total of 1,172 battle 
deaths. The 1,000 battle death criterion is satisfied regardless of which numbers are used. 
Given that the battle deaths from the Pakistani side were low-end estimates, one also 
ensures that no other estimation would drop the battle death total under 1,000. While one 
could also examine whether or not the states formally declared war, it is not as steady as 
the battle death criteria as different states are likely to have different means of declaring 
war. The battle death criterion is less relative, thus more reliable. One must not forget 
that these states constantly fired upon one another across the Line of Control, and the 
Kargil War could have been seen as a continuation of that fighting, which would have 
decreased the chances of formal war being declared. There appeared to be little about the 
war that separated itself from past border conflicts betweel). the states of India and 
Pakistan. 
39 
Maturity of Indian and Pakistani Democracies 
India 
Much more difficulty is found as one attempts to qualify the belligerents as 
mature democracies or even liberal regimes. Michael Doyle (2012, 16) classifies India as 
a liberal regime from 1947 to 1975, then again from 1977 until the study's publication in 
1983. India was still a liberal regime when Doyle updated his list in 1991 (2012, 147-
149). While Doyle's research was done before the Kargil War, there were not enough 
functional or structural changes in India from 1991 to 1999 to lead one to believe that 
India would have lost its status as a liberal regime. Nothing happened over that time to 
change India's status as a democracy, either. Therefore, India, in 1999, appears to qualify 
for scrutiny under Democratic Peace according to the criteria created by Doyle. 
Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (20 11) are not convinced 
of India's status. Their data suggests the last political change in India was in 1995 and, 
from that point, India scores a "3" in Executive Recruitment, a "4" in Competitiveness of 
Political Participation and a "7" in Constraint on Chief Executive. India was quite close 
to being a mature democracy as it needed a "5" in Competitiveness of Political 
Participation, which would mean their political participation was competitive. A "4" 
means Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr found India's political participation to be transitional. 
Pakistan 
Pakistan's classification is even more difficult to determine. Through 1991 Doyle 
does not classify Pakistan as possessing a liberal regime. Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr's 
(2011) measurement for maturity finds that Pakistan was not a mature democracy during 
the Kargil War. Their research suggests that Pakistan has never been a mature 
democracy. During the Kargil War, Pakistan did score a "3" in Executive Recruitment, a 
"3" in Competitiveness of Political Participation and a "6" in Constraint on Chief 
Executive. Like India Pakistan failed on Competitiveness of Political Participation in 
terms of being a mature democracy. 
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One may not even need to consult scholars to make a judgment on Pakistan's 
status as a mature democracy. The most significant piece of evidence is the military coup 
that took place in Pakistan in October 1999 (Chandran 2008, 23). A state unstable 
enough that could have a regime change through a coup was probably not a mature 
democracy _or liberal regime. The regime change did not aid democracy in Pakistan as 
Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011) rate the new regime as a "0" in Executive 
Recruitment, a "2" in ·Competitiveness of Political Participation and a "1" in Constraint 
on Chief Executive. 
While democratic elements may have been in play in Pakistan, the state appears to 
lack the institutions necessary to classify it as a mature democracy. One could even make 
an argument that by harboring terrorists Pakistan also fails to qualify for Kant's Perpetual 
Peace as his Preliminary Articles would be violated by a state harboring terrorists. These 
arguments create an enormous challenge to one who wanted to identify Pakistan as a 
mature democracy or liberal regime. Based upon the weakness (or absence) of their 
institutions to prevent a coup, Pakistan does not qualify as a state that can be scrutinized 
by Democratic Peace. 
Implications for Democratic Peace 
This case fails to challenge Democratic Peace because Pakistan cannot be 
classified as a mature democracy or liberal regime. The volatility of the state of Pakistan 
suggests it lacked the institutions of a mature democracy. India did not possess this 
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problem and even went so far as to qualify as a liberal regime. The conflict itself could 
have challenged Democratic Peace by virtue of meeting the 1,000 battle death criteria. 
This case serves to demonstrate how the criteria set by Michael Doyle would be used to 
evaluate a potential challenger to Democratic Peace. 
United States of America 
CHAPTER VI 
THE WAR OF 1812 
Regime Type of Belligerents 
The United States of America was a republic at the time of the War of 1812. 
Michael Doyle (2012) classifies the states above the Mason-Dixon Line as liberal. 
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Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) do not consider the United 
States to be a mature democracy until1871. The United States presents a complex case 
in terms of becoming a liberal state/mature democracy, and it will be further evaluated in 
the next chapter. 
Great Britain 
Great Britain was a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of 
democracy at the time ofthe War of 1812. Doyle (2012) does not consider Great Britain 
to be liberal until1832 when the Reform Act was passed by Parliament. Marshall, 
Jaggers and Gurr do not consider Great Britain to be a mature democracy until 1922. 
Great Britain's status will be further examined in the next chapter. 
The American Case for War 
The United States of America and Great Britain did not have a particularly good 
relationship after the American Revolution concluded in 1783. Some could argue that 
relations were improved by the Jay Treaty in 1794, but, in drafting a war message to 
Congress in May 1812, President James Madison found it difficult not to accuse the 
British of unjustifiably hostile behavior since the American Revolution (Stagg 2012, 18). 
Madison argued that Great Britain had made it difficult for the United States to establish 
trade and diplomatic relations with its former mother country (2012, 18). Madison also 
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accused the British of violating American neutral rights during its wars with France as he 
worked on his appeal to Congress to declare war (2012, 18). 
For reasons unknown President Madison decided to change his argument for war 
and began a second draft (Stagg 2012, 18). He believed that it was not necessary to go 
"back beyond the renewal in 1803 of the war in which Great Britain is engaged" (2012, 
19). His new draft accused Great Britain of "a series of acts, hostile to the United States, 
as an Independent and neutral nation" (2012, 19). A list of grievances followed in 
chronological order. Madison noted in 1803, when the Anglo-French war resumed, the 
United States and Great Britain were engaged in "negotiations that might have ended the 
British practice of impressing seamen, especially Americans, from neutral vessels on the 
high seas a way of conscripting crews for the Royal Navy" (2012, 19). While the British 
ministry appeared genuine in its willingness to compromise, they did not follow through 
with an agreement (2012, 19). Madison further noted that the British violated American 
territorial waters even to the point of entering American harbors and "want only spilling 
American blood" (2012, 19)."' J. C. A. Stagg notes that President Madison was alluding 
to April 1806 "when HMS Leander had sailed into New York Harbor and delivered a 
broadside that killed an American seaman named John Pierce" (2012, 19). Stagg 
suggests that Madison may have also reminded his intended audience of an incident in 
June 1807 "when HMS Leopard had attacked the USS Chesapeake off the Virginia coast, 
disabling it, killing several members of its crew, and seizing four more for service in the 
Royal Navy" (2012, 19). 
President Madison continued on to the "most serious dispute in Anglo-American 
relations" (Stagg 2012, 19). Madison condemned Great Britain's practice of blockading 
French ports as well as the ports of French allies, which kept resources from the United 
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States that they would have received through neutral trade (2012, 19). Madison did not 
dispute Great Britain's right to blockade an enemy, but argued that the British did not 
administer the blockades through "the presence of an adequate force" (2012, 19). 
Madison noted that after 1806 the British resorted to a system that "permitted British 
naval vessels to seize and confiscate neutral shipping and cargoes virtually at will and 
almost anywhere on the high seas" (2012, 19). The British would not discontinue these 
practices until the United States convinced France to accept British goods as neutral 
property in French ports (2012, 20). Madison took this demand as proof that the British 
were not concerned with denying France with access to goods, but, rather, concerned 
with destroying "legitimate trade by neutral nations to promote illegitimate trade between 
belligerents" (2012, 20). 
President Madison would remind Congress that the United States did not 
passively accept the actions of the British. He noted the passage of multiple acts such as 
Non-Importation Law of 1806, the Embargo of 1807-1809 and the Non-Intercourse Laws 
of 1809 and 1811, which were all passed in hopes of improving British treatment of 
American trade (Stagg 2012, 20). Madison also mentioned the willingness of previous 
administrations to diplomatically resolve the issues between the states only to have the 
British rebuff the initiatives or deal with the United States in bad faith (2012, 20). The 
president would also note that he uncovered that the British had a secret agent in the 
United States in 1809 for the purpose of a "subversion of our Government, and a 
dismemberment of our happy union" (2012, 20). 
President Madison's final argument was based upon the "recent outbreak of 
hostilities on the northwestern frontiers of the republic between the local Indian nations 
and the westward-moving American settlers" (Stagg 2012, 20). Madison blamed the 
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hostilities of the Native Americans on British traders and garrisons in Canada (2012, 20). 
Stagg considers this an allusion to the Battle of Tippecanoe (2012, 20). The battle was 
fought on November 7, 1811, between the forces of the territory of Indiana's governor, 
William Henry Harrison, and a loose confederation of Native American warriors led by 
"the Shawnee brothers Tenskwatawa ... and Tecumseh" (2012, 20). Madison claimed to 
have evidence of a British influence on the Native Americans to fight the Americans 
(2012, 21). 
President Madison concluded his argument by summarizing that the "British 
actions that had harmed the United States, actions he believed could be undertaken only 
by a belligerent power and not by one that was supposed to be at peace with a neutral" 
(Stagg 2012, 21). Madison would stop short of requesting that Congress declare war 
because he felt that Section 8 in Article 1 of the Constitution prevented him from making 
such a request. Respect for the Constitution also led to Madison rejecting Treasury 
comptroller Richard Rush that the president and his cabinet appear before Congress to 
deliver the message (2012, 21). 
American Requirements for Peace 
President Madison's message to Congress on June 1. By June 17 war resolutions 
had passed both chambers (Stagg 2012, 46). Immediately after the resolutions passed, 
Secretary of State James Monroe summoned British minister in Washington D.C., 
Augustus John Foster, to the State Department (2012, 47). Monroe informed Foster of 
the American requirements for peace. The first requirement was a treaty signed by Great 
Britain containing a definition of blockades that copies the definition set by the Anglo-
Russian treaty of 1801 (2012, 47). The second requirement would be placed into 
American and British law and would declare "that the two nations would forgo the 
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employment of each other's nationals in their merchant marines" (2012, 47). President 
Madison and Congress were convinced that American force could coerce the British into 
meeting these requirements. 
Description of the Conflict 
Stagg notes that despite the fact that Great Britain was preoccupied with fighting 
Napoleon Bonaparte's France, the American efforts was marked "more by military 
fiascoes than successes on land and interspersed with occasional naval victories at sea 
that, though gratifying to the nation's tender sense of pride, were inconsequential in terms 
of its larger outcomes" (2012, 48). Stagg credits the ending of the Napoleonic Wars in 
Europe for ending the War of 1812 more than any American effort (2012, 48). Stagg 
suggests that the ability of the United States to emerge without any significant damage 
was enough for Americans to claim a victory (2012, 48). 
The war itself would last from June 18, 1812, to February 17, 1815 (Stagg 2012, 
154). The fighting would continue until the news of peace made to New Orleans on 
March 18, 1815 (2012, 153). Despite the fall of Washington D.C. in October 1814 (2012, 
145), the Duke of Wellington believed the British did not have adequate naval vessels in 
the Great Lakes to protect their gains nor did he believe the gains were large enough to 
warrant any more fighting or attempts to receive more in negotiations (2012, 146). Stagg 
suggests that the duke effectively told his superiors to settle for status quo ante bellum 
(20 12, 146). The British ministry agreed as the mounting costs of war were creating 
difficulties with Parliament in late 1814 (20 12, 146). 
Peace 
Delegations from both states met in the Flemish city of Ghent in August 1814 to 
attempt to negotiate a peace. Despite British victories and further victories during 
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negotiations, both sides agreed to status quo ante bellum in December 1814 (Stagg 2012, 
147). Stagg credits the skills of the American diplomats to achieve such an outcome 
(2012, 48). The British prince regent ratified the treaty on December 28, 1814. The 
United States Congress ratified the treaty on February 17, 1815. 
Future Work to Maintain Peace 
Stagg credits the atmosphere created by a largely peaceful (by the end of the war) 
Europe for the ability of the United States, Canada and Great Britain to resolved their 
differences (2012, 167). A convention in July 1815 restored commercial relations 
between the states (2012, 147). Matters such as boundary disputes, impressment, fishing 
rights and naval armaments on the Great Lakes "were taken up in negotiations that 
culminated in a more comprehensive convention in October 1818" (2012, 147). Stagg 
notes that a potential arms race along the Great Lakes was avoided by the Rush-Bagot 
agreement, named for United States Secretary of State Richard Rush and British minister 
Charles B agot, in April 1817. 
Formal Declaration 
CHAPTER VII 
ANALYSIS OF THE WAR OF 1812 
Qualifications as a War 
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There are two ways in which the War of 1812 can be qualified as a war for the 
purposes of challenging Democratic Peace. The first way is to look at state declarations. 
The United States Senate, with the House of Representatives already approving a war 
resolution almost two weeks earlier, voted to declare war on Great Britain on June 17, 
1812 (Stagg 2012, 46). 
1,000 Battle Death Criteria 
While one could argue that a formal declaration is sufficient, the 1,000 battle 
death criteria set forth by Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman (20 10) is much 
more uniform than seeking a formal declaration of war. The 1,000 battle death criteria is 
almost universally accepted in international war research (Ray 1995, 103). The formal 
declaration of war needs only to be used should one not be able to find battle death 
counts. 
American battle death count. 
The War of 1812 occurred before Sarkees and Wayman (2010) data set began 
recording interstate wars. That creates a need to find the battle death count elsewhere. 
Donald R. Hickey (2006) provides battle death counts. Hickey found that 2,260 
American troops were killed in action the War of 1812 (2006, 297). J. C. A. Stagg cites 
the number, but notes sickness and primitive medical care could have pushed the death 
total of American regulars to 5,200 (2012, '156). Stagg notes that "one historian has 
estimated that somewhere in the region of 15,000 Americans of all descriptions, including 
regulars, militia, naval personnel, and civilians, might have died from causes that were 
directly related to the conflict" (2012, 156). 
British battle death count. 
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While there are varying casualty numbers on the British side, Stagg suggests that 
is possible 2,700 British and Canadian troops were killed in action during the war (2012, 
156). Stagg notes, however, that "British and Canadian losses have never been calculated 
with any comparable precision" (2012, 156). He also fmds it possible 10,000 Britons and 
Canadians, including those on naval vessels and privateers, could have died as a result of 
the war (2012, 156). 
War of 1812's War Status 
With the statistics provided by Hickey (2006) and Stagg (2012), the War of 1812 
met the 1,000 battle death criteria of Sarkees and Wayman (2010). In addition to the 
battle death criteria, both the United States and Great Britain met the participant 
requirement of committing 1,000 combat troops or suffering 100 battle deaths . Both 
states surpassed both requirements. 
Maturity of British and American Democracies 
Great Britain 
Michael Doyle does not consider Great Britain to be liberal until1832 (2012, 15). 
He credits the Reform Bill of 1832 for Great Britain's emergence as a liberal state and for 
its ability to be more peaceful toward other liberal regimes (2012, 146). He argues that 
the Reform Bill of 1832 "defined actual representation as the formal source of 
sovereignty of the British Parliament" (2012, 146) and that it allowed the states to 
negotiate "their disputes despite, for example, severe British grievances against the 
Northern blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties" (2012, 146). 
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Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (20 11) are not so quick to 
classify Great Britain as a mature democracy. They do not view the United Kingdom as a 
mature democracy until1922. The difference of almost a century does not affect the 
status of the War of 1812's challenge to Democratic Peace, but it does demonstrate the 
stricter requirements of Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr. Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 
considered the British democracy to be mature after the first election after the creation of 
the Irish Free State. Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr considered that event enough to increase 
the United Kingdom's scores in Executive Recruitment and Competitiveness of Political 
Participation to mature levels. 
United States 
Great Britain's inability to qualify as a liberal regime during the War of 1812 
effectively ends this conflict's challenge to Democratic Peace, but that does not mean the 
status of the United States should be ignored. Doyle, as well as, Marshall, Jaggers and 
Gurr possess a view of the United States that needs to be questioned. Their views on the 
United States' liberalness suggest that their criteria for determining which states are 
liberal or possess mature democracies is incomplete. 
Doyle has the United States listed as a liberal regime from its inception in 1776 
(2012, 147), but he does so with a footnote. He argues that the "United States was liberal 
only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout" 
(2012, 149). Doyle also makes this distinction for certain Swiss cantons in the 18th 
century (2012, 149). 
Doyle apparently believes the institution of slavery can keep a state, or part of a 
state, from being liberal. It would be difficult for anyone to classify a state that permits 
slavery to be liberal. Even with the abolition of slavery, a large part of the United States 
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disenfranchised African-Americans until the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It could be 
argued that the passage of the 15th Amendment, which prohibited the denial of suffrage 
based on race, established those rights and that is enough to make the United States 
liberal. Doyle appears to make this argument by stating that he takes into account if male 
suffrage is wide, which he defines as 30 percent (2012, 149). He argues that this criteria 
meets Kant's open to "achievement" by inhabitants criteria (2012, 149). Even if that is 
the case, it was not enacted until 1870, yet Doyle classifies the United States as liberal in 
1865. One must also consider the fact that women were not granted suffrage until1920, 
and they constitute half the population. Doyle argues that his liberal regimes grant 
female suffrage within a generation it being "demanded by an extensive female suffrage 
movement" (2012, 149). When the United States became completely liberal, by Doyle's 
standards, in 1865, a majority of adults were not allowed to vote. Given the fact that the 
northern states only permitted white, landowning males to vote at the inception of the 
United States, it can be argued that Doyle does not consider disenfranchisement and the 
granting of suffrage to all adults to be crucial to a state's liberalness. 
Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011) appear to dismiss the issues of 
disenfranchisement and the granting of suffrage to all adults, too. There are two times in 
their data set where the United States is classified as a mature democracy. The first time 
was from 1845 to 1850, then the United States became a mature democracy again in 1871 
and has retained the classification to the present (2011). Their criteria for mature 
democracies comes from their measures of Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, 
Competitiveness of Political Participation and Constraints on the Chief Executive. From 
the beginning of the study to the present day, the United States satisfies the requirements 
for a mature democracy on the Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment and 
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Constraints on the Chief Executive. Competitiveness of Political Participation is the only 
one of the three variables that fluctuates. Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (20 11) rate the 
United States' political participation as "Competitive" from 1845 to 1850 and 1871 to the 
present day, but one must wonder how competitive political participation can be if the 
electoral system ignores racial minorities and women. It could also be argued that the 
rating on Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment was too high due to the racial and 
sexual restraints on voting and, thus, racial and sexual restraints on holding elected office. 
Implications for Democratic Peace 
Much like the case of the Kargil War, the War of 1812 fails to challenge 
Democratic Peace. Great Britain was not a liberal state and, despite Doyle's 
classification, it is difficult to make a case for the United States as a liberal regime. This 
case's contribution to this study is to demonstrate possible incomplete criteria for Doyle's 
liberal regimes and Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr's mature democracies. Neither criteria 
appears to factor in whether portions of the populace are kept from the ballot box or even 
allowed to vote at all. Can a state be liberal or claim to possess a mature democracy if 
adults are kept from voting on basis of race and sex? Doyle attempts to tackle this 
argument with his 30 percent threshold for male suffrage as well as arguing that his 
liberal regimes grant female suffrage within a generation of it being demanded. These 
criteria suggest that Doyle's threshold for being liberal is rather liberal itself. Doyle 
admits as much when he notes "this list of liberal regimes is thus more inclusive than a 
list of democratic regimes, or polyarchies" (2012, 149). From Kant to Doyle, the 
importance of a state being a republic is listed many times, yet the process of a republic 
electing its leader and selecting who is eligible to vote has not received enough scrutiny. 
Peru 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE CENEPA VALLEY WAR 
Regime Type of the Belligerents 
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Peru was a republican democracy at the time of the Cenepa Valley War. Michael 
Doyle lists Peru as a liberal state from 1950 to 1962, 1963 to 1968 and 1980 through the 
publishing of his list on liberal states in 1991 (2012, 148). Monty G. Marshall, Keith 
Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (20 11) never classified Peru as a mature democracy from its 
creation until the publishing of the Polity IV Project. The maturity of Peru's democracy 
will be further examined in the following chapter. 
Ecuador 
Ecuador was a republican democracy at the time of the Cenepa Valley War. Doyle 
lists Ecuador as a liberal state from 1948 to 1963 and from 1979 through the publishing 
of his list in 1991 (2012, 149). Much like with Peru, Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011) 
did not find Ecuador to be a mature democracy at any point in its history through the 
publishing of the Polity IV Project. The maturity of Ecuador's democracy will be further 
examined in the following chapter. 
Historical Context of the War 
In Latin America 
When Peru and Ecuador began the Cenepa Valley War on January 26, 1995, it was 
hardly an isolated event between the two states. It was the continuation of a border 
dispute that had been going on for over 165 years (Elbow 1996, 93). In fact such border 
disputes are hardly new in the Americas. During the 300 years of Spanish colonial rule, 
the Spaniards gave little attention to delimiting borders between different administrative 
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divisions of their empire ( 1996, 94 ). Elbow suggests that the Spanish's lack of interest in 
establishing these borders has led to "virtually every Latin American country [having] 
disputes with one or another of its neighbors" (1996, 94). Elbow cites specific cases such 
as "Venezuelan claims to the western two-thirds of the Guyana and its dispute with 
Colombia over Caribbean territorial waters" ( 1996, 94-95) and Argentina's claims to the 
Falkland Islands (1996, 95). 
Between Peru and Ecuador 
The territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador begins with Ecuador's claim to 
"Amazonian territories that lie between the Rfo Amazonas ... and the drainage divide 
separating the Rfo Napo from the Putumayo" (Elbow 1996, 95). If all Ecuadorian claims 
were honored, the state's size would increase by 70,000 square miles (1996, 95). Ecuador 
bases its claims on three historical arguments. The first argument centers around the 
expedition of Gonzalo Pizarro and Francisco de Orellana in 1541 from Quito (1996, 95). 
The expedition split up at the Napo River with Orellana and his men following the Napo 
downstream to the Amazon River (1996, 95). Ecuadorians argue that Orellana's 
departure from Quito establishes their claim to the disputed lands while Peruvians claim 
that Orellana was acting under orders from Pizarro, whose authority issued from Lima 
(1996, 95). The second historical argument centers around King Philip II of Spain 
granting missionaries from Quito the right to evangelize the natives of the Amazon basin 
in 1563 (1996, 96). Ecuadorians assert their claim to the disputed lands because the 
missions were located in the disputed area were administered from the Audiencia of 
Quito with a royal edict (1996, 96). The third historical argument centers around the 
Treaty of Guayaquil (1996, 96). The treaty was signed by Gran Colombia and Peru after 
a Gran Colombia victory in the Battle of Tarqui (1996, 96). Peru agreed to a northern 
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border beginning at the Tumbes River and following the Amazon River from the mouth 
of the Chinchipe River to where it entered Brazil (1996, 96). The Treaty of Guayaquil 
was signed and ratified in 1829, but was never enacted due to Gran Colombia breaking 
up into Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia in 1830 (1996, 96). Ecuador claims the border 
agreed upon in the treaty while Peru argues Ecuador was not a sovereign state at the time 
and that the treaty was signed with Gran Colombia is invalid due to the dissolution of 
Gran Colombia. 
The border conflict was considered a diplomatic matter until Peru began military 
incursions into the disputed area in 1935 (Elbow 1996, 96). War broke out in 1941, and 
the result was Peru advancing war into Ecuadorian territory (1996, 96). Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and the United States mediated and brokered the "Protocol of Peace, 
Friendship, and Boundaries of Rio de Janeiro" (Palmer 1997, 111 ), which both states 
signed in January 1942. While the powers for the resolution were ultimately in the hands 
of Ecuador and Peru per the Rio Protocol, there were clear obligations for the guarantors: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States (1997, 112). With respect to future 
conflicts, Peru argued that the Rio Protocol effectively ended any rights claimed by 
Ecuador (1997, 111). Ecuador would argue that its sovereign rights are based upon legal 
and historical precedents, on their claim that the Rio Protocol was signed under duress, 
and that it was impossible to execute the Rio Protocol because of certain anomalies of 
geography (1997, 111). 
From 1942 to 1948 the Ecuador-Peru Boundary Commission reached definitive 
demarcation of over 95% of the border without incident and in accordance to the Rio 
Protocol's stipulations (Palmer 1997, 112). The harmony did not last as a United States 
Army Air Corps aerial survey in 1946 revealed that the "height of the land that was to 
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determine the border was not where the agreement had stipulated in one small section 
because of the presence of a previously uncharted river and a mountain spur" (1997, 
113). This section of the border was not marked and the Ecuadorian government ordered 
its demarcation team to cease activities in 1948 around the Cordillera del Condor and 
Cenepa River area (1997, 113). 
Some suggest that Ecuador knew of the existence of the Cordillera del Condor 
and Cenepa River area as early as 1943, but chose to delay the Ecuador-Peru 
Demarcation Commission as Ecuador attempted to find a way to maintain access to the 
Amazon River in this sector (Palmer 1997, 114). Ecuador also had declared from 1960 
onward that the Rio Protocol was null in international juridical terms due to the 
"inexecutability" of an essential segment of the agreement ( 1997, 114 ). Palmer suggests 
that the firmness of these positions complicated the possibility of finding any final 
resolution to the border issues (1997, 114). 
In 1980 Ecuador deployed forces into the small section of disputed boundary 
which was claimed by Peru (Palmer 1997, 114). This led to the Paquisha conflict during 
January 1981, when a series of serious events took place, culminating in the removal of 
Ecuadorian forces from their outposts in the disputed area (1997, 114). Ecuador called 
upon the Organization of American States to mediate while Peru insisted on the guarantor 
states of the Rio Protocol (1997, 114). A compromise was reached where the OAS 
mediated the case, but selected four agents, the guarantors of the Rio Protocol, to act on 
its behalf (1997, 114). Peace was restored, but the dispute was not resolved. 
The Cenepa Valley War 
Palmer argues that the precipitant factor for the Cenepa Valley War was 
"Ecuador's gradual redeployment of military units, beginning in 1991 , into the dispute 
57 
territory east of the Cordillera del Condor along the Cenepa River" ( 1997, 119). Three 
heavily fortified bases were constructed on high ground at Tiwintza, Cueva de los Tayos 
and Base Sur (1997, 119). Peru appeared to be aware of Ecuador's redeployment, but 
took no action until 1994 when Peruvian patrols warned the Ecuadorians to withdraw 
(1997, 119). Palmer suggested that little diplomatic activity "preceded the outbreak of 
large-scale hostilities on this occasion, which suggests that the militaries of both 
countries played a more significant role in the 1995 developments than had been the case 
heretofore" ( 1997, 119). 
Once Ecuador did not respond to the warnings issued by Peruvian patrols, local 
Peruvian forces probed the area in December 1994 and January 1995, then rushed into a 
confrontation (Palmer 1997, 119). Peruvian local forces were soon forced to withdraw, 
which caused Peru to mobilize its military (1997, 119). The forces met in the Upper 
Cenepa Valley and limited their fighting specifically to that area (1997, 119). Published 
reports claimed that over the next five weeks, Peru lost nine aircraft and both 
governments spent an estimated $500 million between them (1997, 119). Ecuador 
appeared to retain two of the forward outposts despite Peruvian announcements claiming 
there were no more Ecuadorian soldiers on Peruvian soil ( 1997, 119). 
Peace 
Palmer suggests that due to Peru's inability to achieve victory militarily or to even 
force a stalemate, Peru "went on the diplomatic offensive to remove Ecuador's forces, via 
the guarantor countries, by declaring (13 February) a 'unilateral' cease-fire and 
invoking ... their good offices" (1997, 121). Palmer notes that Peru almost immediately 
broke its own cease-fire as it continued to attempt to push Ecuadorian forces back into 
Ecuador (1997, 121). 
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To the surprise of Peru, Ecuador requested an emergency meeting of the Rio 
Protocol guarantors in January 1995 (Palmer 1997, 121). Peru quickly agreed and a 
meeting was held in Brasilia (1997, 122). The ltamaraty Peace Declaration was signed 
by Peru and Ecuador on February 17, 1995 (1997, 122). As noted above the fighting 
continued through the end of February. Another meeting was called in Montevideo, 
Uruguay, on February 28, 1995, during the inauguration of the president of Uruguay 
(1997, 123). A second declaration was enough to cease hostilities and to allow the 
guarantors to organize and carry out the proposed Ecuador-Peru Military Observer 
Mission (1997, 123). The separation of Peruvian and Ecuadorian forces began by the end 
of March. The withdrawal of military units from the disputed area was completed in 
mid-May (1997, 123). 
59 
CHAPTER IX 
ANALYSIS OF THE CENEPA VALLEY WAR 
Qualifications as a War 
Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman (20 10) qualify the 1995 conflict 
between Peru and Ecuador as a war. Their data notes that Peru suffered 950 battle deaths 
and that Ecuador suffered 550 battle deaths during the two month conflict. The 1,500 
combined battle deaths qualifies the conflict as a war. Palmer (1997) cites published 
reports that claimed there were 100 to 300 casualties during the conflict, but Sarkees and 
Wayman's data is more recent. Palmer's article argued about the peacekeeping 
procedures, which suggested that accruing battle death statistics was not a focus of his 
research. Sarkees and Wayman specifically sought accurate battle death counts. 
Combined with the fact that their report is more recent than Palmer's, their battle death 
count should be treated as more accurate. 
Maturity of Peruvian and Ecuadorian Democracies 
Peru 
According to Michael Doyle (2012) Peru has an interesting history in regard to its 
liberalness. He lists Peru as a liberal state from 1950 to 1962, 1963 to 1968 and 1980 
through the publishing of his list on liberal states in 1991 (2012, 148). It is possible that 
Peru could have lost its liberal states in those four years. Palmer notes that the political 
climate in Peru in 1990, which was marred by "a totally bankrupt bureaucracy; an overall 
inflation rate, accumulated over the 5-year course of the preceding Alan Garda 
government ( 1985-1990), of 2 million percent, which impoverished much of the 
population; and an ongoing guerilla war that had been destroying Peru's infrastructure" 
(1997, 115). It is interesting to note that Doyle did not disqualify Peru as a liberal regime 
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at that point. Given the fact that Peru was organized and stable enough to make Ecuador 
call to the guarantors of the Rio Protocol despite winning the Cenepa Valley War at that 
point in time (1997, 121), it can be argued that Peru did not devolve enough to lose its 
liberal status. 
Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) give a more 
definitive answer in regard to Peru's status as a liberal state or maturity democracy. They 
do not list Peru as a mature democracy in 1995. In fact, they do not classify Peru as a 
mature democracy at any point in its existence. In 1995 Peru received a "2" in 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, which indicates that it was transitional and 
not done via an election. Peru received a "3" in Constraints on Chief Executive, which 
indicates the constraints were slight or moderate and not substantial or greater. Peru also 
received a "3" in Competitiveness of Political Participation, which indicates that political 
participation was factional at the time and not competitive. These scores are significantly 
lower than the scores Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr gave Peru in 1992, which suggests that 
Peru became less mature and less liberal over those three years. Peru could be considered 
liberal by Michael Doyle's standards, but it does not come close to reaching the criteria 
set by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr. 
Ecuador 
With respect to Michael Doyle's list of liberal states, Ecuador is in the same state 
Peru found itself. Doyle lists Ecuador as a liberal state from 1948 to 1963 and from 1979 
through the publishing of his list in 1991 (2012, 149). Palmer (1997) does not say 
anything about the state of Ecuador's government during the Cenepa Valley War, but 
Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr's (2011) data notes that Ecuador 
had the same regime from 1988 to 1997. This suggests that Ecuador would have been 
61 
unlikely to be disqualified as a liberal state by Doyle by the time that the Cenepa Valley 
War began. 
Much like with Peru, Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011) suggest that Ecuador was 
not a mature democracy during the Cenepa Valley War. They also suggest that Ecuador 
has never had a mature democracy or been a liberal state. Ecuador was much closer to 
being a mature democracy than Peru during the Cenepa Valley War according to 
Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr. Ecuador received a "3" in Competitiveness of Executive 
Recruitment, which indicates that Ecuador satisfied this requirement of Marshall, Jaggers 
and Gurr to be a mature democracy. Ecuador received a "7"on Constraints on Chief 
Executive, which indicates that there was executive parity or subordination. That also 
satisfies the requirement for a mature democracy. Ecuador received a "4" in 
Competitiveness of Political Participation, which indicates that participation was 
transitional and not competitive. This is where Ecuador failed to be a mature democracy 
in the eyes of Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr. 
Implications for Democratic Peace 
The case of Cenepa Valley War could challenge Michael Doyle's Liberal Peace. 
Doyle did have Peru and Ecuador listed as liberal regimes as late as 1991, and the work 
of Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr suggests that it is unlikely that Ecuador changed enough 
over those four years to lose its classification as a liberal state. There is doubt regarding 
Peru. Peru underwent a regime change in 1992 that lowered its score in Competitiveness 
in Executive Recruitment, Competitiveness of Political Participation and Constraints on 
Chief Executive. One could argue that Peru would have lost its liberal status by the 
Cenepa Valley War. The standards of Marshall, Jaggers .and Gurr suggest that Peru may 
have never been a mature democracy. 
62 
One can argue that the Cenepa Valley War does not challenge Democratic Peace 
by the criteria set by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr. The fact that this newer criteria must be 
used suggests that Doyle's criteria may not be an accurate measure of liberalness or 
maturity. Even if one did the work and discovered that Peru was not a liberal regime 
during the Cenepa Valley War using the criteria of Doyle, there still exists a large gap 
between two measures of liberalness/maturity. There are periods of time where Doyle 
finds both states to be liberal while Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr never fmd either state to 
have a mature democracy. 
CHAPTER X 
RESULTS 
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The preceding cases served as examples in which the criteria could work as well 
as provide example of their flaws. Their flaws will be detailed and examined in this 
chapter. The chapter will examine Michael Doyle's criteria for classifying states a liberal, 
then it will examine Monty G Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr's criteria for 
measuring maturity in democracies with suggestions which areas to improve. 
Measuring Maturity 
Michael Doyle 
Michael Doyle's measurements for liberalness are adequate to defend Democratic 
Peace from most cases that could challenge the theory. His criteria is "market and private 
property economies; polities that are externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical 
rights; and 'republican' (whether republican or monarchical), representative, government" 
(2012, 17). In the case of the Kargil War and War of 1812, these criteria were enough to 
disqualify Pakistan and Great Britain, respectively, as liberal states. These criteria, 
however, may not be able to disqualify eeither Ecuador or Peru in the case of the Cenepa 
Valley War. Ecuador's political consistency from 1988 to 1997 (Marshall, Jaggers and 
Gurr 2011) suggests that Doyle's classifying of Ecuador as a liberal state in 1991 is likely 
to have been unchanged by 1995. Monty G Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr 
(2011) note a volatile political climate in Peru during the 1990s and lowered scores in 
categories they used to measure maturity. This volatility could lead one to doubt whether 
Peru would have still been a liberal regime by the start of the Cenepa Valley War. 
Even if one could find Peru not to be a liberal state in the Cenepa Valley War or 
could claim that the Cenepa Valley War is an isolated incident, Doyle's criteria for 
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measuring liberalness appears to have some curious omissions. These particularly affect 
the classification of the United States. The first omission is female suffrage. Doyle 
argues that a state can be classified as liberal if "female suffrage is granted within a 
generation of it being demanded" (2012, 17). Would a liberal state deny suffrage to half 
of its citizens until they requested that right? More curious, however, is the assertion by 
Doyle that the United States granted women suffrage within a generation. One could 
argue that women requested suffrage with the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 and the 
Declaration of Sentiments it produced. Suffrage was among the demands, and the 19th 
Amendment was not ratified until 70 years later. That is much longer than the generation 
specified by Doyle. 
The second omission is suffrage of racial minorities. It is obvious that Doyle does 
not consider a state that permits slavery to be liberal as he only classifies the northern 
United States as liberal until1865. Doyle does not appear, however, to be concerned 
with whether or not a state attempts to prevent the disenfranchisement of certain groups. 
The first piece of evidence to support to support this claim is that Doyle selected the end 
of the American Civil War in 1865 as the point at which the whole United States became 
liberal despite the fact that the freed slaves were not granted the right to vote until 1870 
with the ratification of the 15th Amendment. One also could argue that the United States 
was not liberal until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as the 15th Amendment did not stop 
state level or local level disenfranchisement of African-Americans. Doyle appears to take 
none of this into consideration despite claiming that liberal states have republican, 
representative governments (2012, 17). Slavery and the disenfranchisement of African-
American voters may not have affected the system of republican, representative 
government in place, but it could be argue that both institutions created a government that 
was not truly representative of all Americans. How liberal is a state the employs these 
institutions? 
Monty G Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr 
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Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (20 11) created criteria for 
measuring mature democracies that appear to better defend Democratic Peace from 
potential challenges than the criteria of Michael Doyle. They suggest that a mature 
democracy would have three characteristics: open and fully competitive political 
participation, elective executive recruitment and substantial constraints on the chief 
executive. Open and fully competitive political participation is measured by the variable 
Competitiveness of Political Participation. A state viewed as "Competitive" would be 
coded as "5." A state coded with any other number is unlikely to have open and fully 
competitive political participation. Open executive recruitment is measured by the 
variable Competitiveness Executive Recruitment. A state that would satisfy the open 
executive recruitment characteristic would have elections for their executives, which 
would be coded as "3" for the Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment variable. A 
state coded with any other number is unlikely to have open executive recruitment. 
Finally, restraints on the chief executive are measured with the Constraint on the Chief 
Executive variable. Chief executives with substantial limitations are coded with "5;" 
however, there are measures above "5" that would satisfy the characteristic, too. An 
intermediate category coded as "6" and "Executive parity or subordination," coded as 
"7 ," would both satisfy the characteristic of chief executives with substantial limitations. 
States coded with "5" in Competitiveness of Political Participation, "3" in 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment and "5," "6" or "7" in Constraint on Chief 
Executive could be considered mature democracies. 
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These criteria appears to be more restrictive than Doyle's criteria. The criteria of 
Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr do not find any of the combatants in any of the three cases to 
have mature democracies while Doyle's criteria suggests that four of the six combatants 
were liberal at the time of their respective cases. By the year 2011, Marshall, Jaggers and 
Gurr find 36 mature democracies in the world. By 1991 Doyle found 54 liberal regimes. 
Despite appearing to be more restrictive than Doyle, Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 
show no more consideration to female suffrage than Doyle. They classify the United 
States as a mature democracy in 1871 and do not evaluate the United States again. They 
do not seem to worry about the fact that the United States denied half of its citizens the 
right to vote for almost 50 more years after it reached maturity. 
Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr appear to take racial suffrage into consideration 
slightly more than Doyle. They find the United States to have a mature democracy in 
1871 and keep it through the publishing of their work. While this appears to value 
Reconstruction over the 15th Amendment, this classification appears to be more 
restrictive than Doyle's classification of the United States. The issue regarding the Voting 
Rights Act is still there, which suggests that Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr's evaluations 
could be revised. 
Summary 
The analyses of the cases provided suggest Michael Doyle's criteria may not be 
restrictive enough to adequately defend Democratic Peace from certain challenges. 
While the application of Monty G Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr's criteria 
could defend Democratic Peace from the challenge of the Cenepa Valley War, their 
criteria made the same omissions regarding liberal states/mature democracies' treatment 
of women and racial minorities. Both Doyle, much earlier in fact, and Marshall, Jaggers 
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and Gurr would agree that the United States was a liberal state/mature democracy from 
1871 to the present day. That classification ignores the inability of women to vote at that 
time as well as the widespread efforts to disenfranchise African-Americans. That creates 
an appearance of the opinion that the state's treatment of women and racial minorities 
does not affect whether or not it is liberal or its democracy mature. If the state's treatment 
of these groups does not affect its status as liberal or mature, then defense of this stance 
will be required. If a democracy refuses the participation of its citizens on the basis of 
sex or race, its status as a democracy much be called into question. It does not appear to 
be mature, yet there is a scenario in which Doyle and Marshall, Jaggers or Gurr would 
disagree. Revision of their criteria for determining whether or not a state is liberal or its 
democracy mature appears to be necessary. 
CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSION 
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What does the examination of these cases mean for Democratic Peace? The more 
restrictive measurements appear to strengthen a competing explanation for peace among 
mature democracies. This chapter will examine the implications of this research for 
Democratic Peace and competing theories. The chapter will close by suggesting future 
research and by exploring the policy implications of this research. 
Implications for Democratic Peace 
Do more restrictive measurements on a democracy's maturity damage Democratic 
Peace's ability to explain the peace among the states whose behavior it explains? This 
research question was proposed at the beginning of the thesis. With the analyses of the 
selected cases, more restrictive measurements appeared to be necessary. These different 
measurements affect regarding Democratic Peace will now be examined. 
Reduction of Applicable States 
Michael Doyle's (2012) classification of liberal states is challenged by the Cenepa 
Valley War. Democratic Peace is not directly harmed by the challenge because the 
classifications of Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) 
disqualifies Ecuador and Peru as mature democracies. This reliance upon Marshall, 
Jaggers and Gurr shrinks the number of states covered by Democratic Peace. In 1991 
Doyle finds 54 liberal states. In 2011 Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr only find 36 mature 
democracies. 
Strengthening of Other Explanations of Peace Among Democracies 
This reduction in liberal states/mature democracies supports the argument of Erik 
Gartzke and Alex Weisiger (2013) that "when democracies are scarce or 
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weak ... democracies face a common threat (20 13, 171 ). " They argue that similarities in 
regime type cause states to band together in the face of a common threat of different 
regimes. This argument is strengthened by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr only finding 36 
mature democracies in 2011. More restrictive measures of liberalness/maturity lead to 
the classification of fewer liberal states/mature democracies. The theory of Democratic 
Peace could still explain the peace among liberal states/mature democracies, but Gartzke 
and Weisiger's (2013) argument of peace between similar states with regimes that are 
scarce in the world. 
The argument of Gartzke and Weisiger appears to apply more to past cases that 
challenged Democratic Peace than to explain the peace among democracies today. Their 
argument specified that democracies would band together when the world contained more 
autocracies. That could explain peace among democratic states in the 1800s and 1900s 
when there were fewer democracies, but it may not be as accurate today. Marshall, 
Jaggers and Gurr's 21-point polity scale accumulates the score of the variables it 
measures. States with negative scores tend to be more autocratic while states with 
positive scores tend to be more democratic. In 2011 a majority of states measured had 
positive scores. Similarities may not be enough to explain the peace among democratic 
states today. It should be noted that Gartzke and Weisiger make no differentiation 
between democracies and mature democracies. Even if mature democracies are still 
scarce by the classification of Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, Gartzke and Weisiger appear to 
group them together with immature democracies. 
Explanations not Mutually Exclusive 
Only time will tell which explanation is more correct. Democratic Peace suggests 
the increase in democracies, especially mature democracies, will create a higher 
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likelihood of peace in the world. Gartzke and Weisiger (2013) argue that the increase in 
democracies, whether mature or not, will result in states dividing and possibly warring 
because of the differences among the states. If the number of mature democracies 
continue to rise, then there will be an opportunity to examine the interactions between 
those states. Even if differences between the states lead to wars between immature 
democracies, mature democracies may still be peaceful toward one another. Due to 
Gartzke and Weisiger grouping all democracies together, Democratic Peace and their 
argument could both explain future interactions between states. 
Future Research 
The cases examined displayed omissions in classifying liberal states/mature 
democracies from Doyle (2012) and Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011). Regardless of 
the criteria used, there appears to be little consideration for female suffrage and the 
disenfranchisement of racial minorities. Doyle considers male suffrage to be wide when 
it is 30% or greater and believes that a liberal state will grant female suffrage within a 
generation of it being requested. Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr do not directly measure 
either potential variable, but do supply the variable Competitiveness of Political 
Participation. Given their classification of the United States as a mature democracy in 
1871, suggest that female suffrage and the disenfranchisement of racial minorities did not 
play a large role in that variable. 
The role of female suffrage and racial disenfranchisement will need to be 
examined in future classification of states. Michael Doyle and Monty G. Marshall, Keith 
Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr provide a satisfactory starting point for future research, but 
one would have to incorporate the omitted criteria. The result of this incorporation could 
lower the number of liberal regimes/mature democracies classified in the world, which 
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could strengthen the argument of Gartzke and Weisiger (2013) that minority regime types 
are more likely to be more peaceful in their interactions with each other. 
That strengthening, however, would not necessarily come at the expense of 
Democratic Peace. As suggested above both explanations are not mutually exclusive. 
Future research may show that the Perpetual Peace of Kant and the Liberal Peace of 
Doyle may not yet have an environment in which to grow. The true test of Democratic 
Peace would come when a majority, or even a plurality, of states in the world are mature 
democracies. Current research, however, does not appear to adequately define what a 
mature democracy is. Further examination of the role of states and their treatment of 
women and racial minorities will need to be factored into determining a democracy's 
maturity. 
Policy Implications 
This research suggest that leaders of a state be mindful of the long path to 
maturity when contemplating invading a state to install a more peaceful regime. While 
states that qualify as mature democracies under more restrictive measurements appear to 
be peaceful toward one another, the path to maturity was a difficult one. The application 
of a representative government does not make a state liberal nor does it make the new 
democracy mature. Even states such as the United States and United Kingdom did not 
gain their maturity quickly or easily. It can be argued that the United States did not gain 
maturity until 1965, which was the result of a long struggle by racial minorities. One 
must also take into account the struggles of women to gain suffrage and the struggle of 
abolitionists to free the slaves. In the United Kingdom, there was a struggle to break 
from the Crown and create a government that was more representative of the people. 
Michael Doyle suggests that did not happen until1832 while Monty G Marshall, Keith 
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Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr suggest it did not happen until the creation of the Irish Free 
State and the subsequent British elections in 1922. Maturity for these two states came at 
the end of a process that last hundreds of years. While the creation of mature 
democracies could make the world a more peaceful place, would any state want to 
dedicate decades and billions of their own currency, at minimum, to take that chance? 
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